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Abstract
Neuroimaging research has demonstrated that mentalizing about false beliefs held by other people recruits the temporo-parietal
junction (TPJ). However, earlier work was limited to a single agent that held a false belief. We investigated the effect of two
agents that held similar or mixed false and/or true beliefs. Participants saw animated stories with two smurfs holding true or false
beliefs (Story phase). At the end of each trial, they were requested to take the perspective of the self or one of the smurfs (Question
phase). We predicted that an increasing number of smurfs holding a false belief would increase activation in the TPJ when
participants have to report the belief of the smurf, because the incongruent belief should have a stronger influence if it is held by
two compared with one agent. This prediction was confirmed as activation in the TPJ during the Story and Question phase
increased when more smurfs held a false belief. Taking the perspective of the self led to stronger activation of the TPJ in the two
conditions that involved a true belief and weakest activation in the condition of two false beliefs. These data suggest that
activation in TPJ depends on the perspective participants take, and that the number of agents holding a false belief influences
activation in the TPJ only when taking the agent’s perspective.
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Introduction
In our daily life, we often interact with other people. We usu-
ally make inferences about these people’s beliefs and mental
states by observing their behaviors or by reading their state-
ments on social media posts. The ability to infer others’mental
states facilitates our social interaction and cooperation. This
process is termed mentalizing or Theory of Mind (Premack &
Woodruff, 1978). Research so far has focused on how we
understand the mind of a single person (Wellman, Cross, &
Watson, 2001), although in real conversations or chat sessions
we often communicate with several people at the time. The
purpose of this article is to investigate systematically how we
attribute beliefs to multiple compared with single agents.
One of the main tasks that has been used to measure
mentalizing capacity is the false belief task (Baron-Cohen,
Leslie, & Frith, 1985). In this task, an object is displaced
unbeknownst to an agent who is temporarily absent. The
participant must infer the agent’s belief on where the ob-
ject was previously, and because this belief conflicts with
current reality, it is termed Bfalse.^ In their seminal work,
Saxe and Kanwisher (2003) proposed that the temporo-
parietal junction (TPJ) may serve to compute other’s be-
liefs and is involved in Breasoning about the content of
mental states^ (p. 1835). Neuroimaging research has since
then confirmed that the TPJ is recruited when people se-
lect another’s perspective and belief (see meta-analyses by
Schurz, Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, & Perner, 2014; Van
Overwalle, 2009; Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). In
addition, the TPJ has been related to self-other distinction
in the control of imitation, agency processing, and per-
spective taking (Brass, Ruby, & Spengler, 2009; Farrer
& Frith, 2002; Ruby & Decety, 2001; Saxe & Powell,
2006; Saxe & Wexler, 2005), as well as in other nonsocial
processes, such as spatial attention reorientation (Cabeza,
Ciaramelli, & Moscovitch, 2012; Corbetta & Shulman,
2002; Krall et al., 2014; Mitchell, 2008; Özdem, Wiese,
et al., 2017; Özdem, Brass, Van der Cruyssen, & Van
Overwalle, 2017). Together, the TPJ plays a crucial role
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in social situations where we have to infer other people’s
mental states or distinguish our own from another’s person
perspective.
An important limitation of previous neuroimaging re-
search on mentalizing and false beliefs is that it is restricted
to the situations where false beliefs had to be inferred con-
sistently for one agent only, either alone or in the presence
of other agents. For instance, in pictorial stories (Bardi,
Desmet, Nijhof, Wiersema, & Brass, 2017; Özdem,
Brass, et al., 2017; Schuwerk et al., 2014), typically there
is only one agent present who is unaware of the displace-
ment and holds a false belief. On the other hand, in verbal
stories (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003), typically two agents are
described of which one is aware that an object is displaced,
while the other is unaware of this and his or her false belief
is requested. These situations capture a variety of social
situations where observers infer mental states of single
and multiple agents. This raises at least two questions that
have not yet been investigated systematically in the false
belief literature. First, does it matter whether one or more
agents hold a specific mental state? Second, what happens
if two agents hold different mental states (one agent the
same true belief as we do and the other a false belief)?
We therefore extended the classical false belief para-
digm, and manipulated systematically whether two
agents held similar or opposing true and/or false beliefs.
To make the attribution of beliefs to the two agents an
even more indispensable requirement for solving the
task, participants did not know in advance whether they
had to take the perspective of one of these agent’s or of
their own, until after the belief formation was finished.
Consequently, during the story phase, participants had to
keep track of the presence of all agents involved or of
their beliefs. A similar procedure was previously intro-
duced in an fMRI study by Schuwerk, Döhnel. and
colleagues (2014).
In the present experiment, we used an animated, spa-
tial version of a false belief task adapted from Özdem,
Brass, et al. (2017) (Fig. 1), in which two smurfs saw a
black target circle that either stayed on the same side of
a frame or jumped to the other side. Importantly, the
circle jumped and afterwards the whole frame was cov-
ered, while the smurf was either present (resulting in a
true belief) or absent (resulting in a false belief).
Consequently, the two smurfs held either similar true
beliefs, similar false beliefs, or mixed false-true beliefs
(Table 1).
Our main prediction is that when two smurfs hold
false beliefs, this should lead to stronger processing in
the mentalizing network than when only one smurf holds
a false belief or none of them (i.e., both smurfs hold a
true belief), and this should show up through slower
behavioral responses and higher fMRI activation,
particularly in the TPJ. Theoretically, the activation of
the TPJ during false belief reasoning is assumed to de-
pend on a process of Bdecoupling^ away from one’s self-
perspective on reality (Hartwright, Apperly, & Hansen,
2015; van der Meer, Groenewold, Nolen, Pijnenborg, &
Aleman, 2011), also conceived as a process of
Breorientation^ from the current reality to one’s mental
representation of the other smurfs’ knowledge and belief
(Cabeza et al., 2012). This process of decoupling is ex-
pected to be more strongly recruited when two rather
than one smurf may hold a false belief, leading to higher
activation of the TPJ. Decoupling is expected to be ab-
sent when there are no false beliefs, leading to weaker
TPJ activation (cf. meta-analysis by Krall et al., 2014).
In contrast, we do not have strong predictions in the
question phase when participants have to tell their own
belief.
Recent work has demonstrated that decoupling away
from one’s self-perspective on reality, also termed Bself-
inhibition,^ is especially triggered when one’s self-
perspective is made salient (Hartwright et al., 2015; van
der Meer et al., 2011). Salience is high in the current study,
because participants have to select constantly between ei-
ther their own or the smurf’s perspective. This decoupling
process increases executive control to monitor and detect
potential conflicts in information input in the posterior me-
dial frontal cortex (pmFC) (Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter,
2004), thereby triggering compensatory adjustments in
cognitive control in the bilateral inferior frontal gyri
(IFG) to avoid or override incorrect responses. In false
belief reasoning, this entails overriding one’s prepotent
true self-perspective to focus on the smurf’s false perspec-
tive (Hartwright et al., 2015; Hartwright, Apperly, &
Hansen, 2012; Rothmayr et al., 2011; Schuwerk et al.,
2014; van der Meer et al., 2011). For this reason, we pre-
dict a parallel pattern of activation in the pmFC as in the
TPJ. Specifically, a gradual increase of activation when
false beliefs are held by more smurfs. Also in parallel with




Twenty-eight adults took part in this study (17 women;
age range: 18-28 years; mean age: 22.1 years), and data
of 25 participants were analyzed: three participants were
excluded due to excessive head movements and one par-
ticipant was excluded due to high error rates (above
50%). All participants were right-handed, as assessed
by the Dutch version of the Edinburgh Inventory
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(Oldfield, 1971). They were paid 20 Euros for their par-
ticipation. Participants reported no abnormal neurological
history and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Participants gave informed consent before the experiment
in accordance with the guidelines of the Medical Ethics
Committee at the Ghent University Hospital (where
Fig. 1. Stimuli and design of the belief task. Similar True beliefs are shown on the left, Mixed beliefs in the middle, and Similar False beliefs on the right.
Perspective questions for the self (i.e., Byou?^) and a smurf are shown at the end of each trial, but only one perspective was actually asked per trial
Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2019) 19:1433–1443 1435
scanning took place) and Brussels University Hospital
(of the principal investigator FVO).
Stimuli
We adapted the belief task and clips from a previous fMRI
study by Özdem, Brass et al. (2017). Participants were pre-
sented with animated video clips. The animations consisted of
a black ball moving in a frame subdivided in two adjacent
(right-left) rectangular parts and two agents: Papa Smurf and
Smurfette (Fig. 1). The location of the ball and the smurfs was
counterbalanced in all tasks and conditions.
All trials in this task started with the frame, the ball
presented either on the right or left rectangular part of
this frame, and the smurfs underneath the frame. Next,
the smurfs simultaneously left the scene towards the op-
posite sides of the screen that were closest to each of
them (e.g., Papa Smurf to the right; Smurfette to the
left). The side where the smurfs were initially positioned
was counterbalanced across conditions. Next, the black
ball jumped to the other side (left-right) of the frame
followed by an occluder covering the frame. Depending
on the condition, this happened in the presence or ab-
sence of one or both smurfs, that is, after the smurfs’
return to the original location so that it could witness
the black ball jumping to the other location (i.e., true
belief) or before the smurfs’ return so that the change
was not witnessed (false belief).
After the occlusion, participants were asked to indicate as
soon as possible where the ball was located (at the left or right
part of the frame) according to Papa Smurf, Smurfette or
themselves. Participants did not know which perspective they
had to take until after the belief formation was finished to
make the attribution of beliefs to the two agents an indispens-
able requirement for solving the task. The target agent of the
question was presented by a black bar that appeared under one
of the smurfs (implying the view according to that smurf) or
with the word ^you?B (in Dutch: Bjou?^) in the middle of the
screen to imply participant’s own perspective (Fig. 1).
Participants had to answer as quickly as possible by press-
ing the corresponding left and right button. Participants
were instructed to keep their eyes focused on the center
of the frame at all times. Note that participants did not
know who (self or smurf) would be the target of the ques-
tion until the end of the trial.
Design and procedure
The design of the experiment involved the within-participant
factors Belief Type (true vs. false), Perspective (self vs.
smurf), and Belief Content (similar vs. mixed). The conditions
differed on the following aspects. First, a true versus false
Belief Type actually refers to smurfs’ belief only, because
participants always held a true belief as they witnessed any
change in the location of the ball. Second, in the similar Belief
Content condition, the two smurfs held the same beliefs, be-
cause they both returned to their initial position early, and they
were able to observe the ball changing its location (similar true
belief) or they both returned after the occluder went up so that
they did not witness any change in the scene (similar false
belief). In the mixed Belief Content condition, the two smurfs
had divergent beliefs about the location of the ball, because
one smurf returned early and observed the change in location
(mixed true belief) while the other smurf returned late and did
not witness it (mixed false belief). Note that in the initial story
phase, these latter two conditions cannot be distinguished be-
cause the target smurf is not yet selected. Rather the conditions
can only be distinguished in the question phase when the
belief of either the smurf holding the true belief or the smurf
holding the false belief had to be indicated.
In addition to these conditions, we had filler trials where the
ball did not jump at all and stayed in the same location. The
filler trials were used to prevent the expectation that the black
ball would always jump to the other side, and hence forced the
participants to pay attention to the whole task. The rest of the
filler videos were varied in the same way as in the other ex-
perimental conditions. The belief task consisted of 182 trials
in total with 24 trials in each experimental condition (96 trials
in the similar condition with an equal number of true and false
belief trials, 72 trials in the mixed condition with an equal
number of true and false belief trials), and 14 fillers. In half
of the conditions, participants were asked to take their own
perspective, whereas in the other half, the participants were
asked to take one of the smurf’s perspective.
Before scanning, participants received instructions and a
practice session to ensure that they understood the instruc-
tions. All participants were assigned to a belief and memory
task in the scanner in this order. All trials in the belief task
were preceded by a jitter with variable duration between 0–
6,050 ms and another jitter with variable duration between 0–
6,050 ms was presented at the end of the video (Fig. 1). After
the jitter, the question bar appeared and remained on the
Table 1. Experimental conditions and predictions for the target Smurf
perspective
Belief condition Self Target Smurf Other Smurf
Similar true True True True
Mixed true True True * False
Mixed false True False ** True
Similar false True False *** False
The Belief Conditions are named after the belief held by the Target Smurf
and the Other Smurf respectively. The level of predicted activation from
the smurf perspective is indicated with asterisks, and becomes stronger
the more the smurfs hold false beliefs
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screen until the participant responded. The memory task was
further ignored, because it did not yield significant activations
and always came after the belief task.
fMRI data acquisition
Images were obtained using a 3 T Magnetom Trio MRI scan-
ner system (Siemens Medical Systems, Erlangen, Germany),
using a 32-channel radiofrequency head coil. First, a high-
resolution anatomical images were collected using a T1-
weighted 3D MPRAGE sequence [TR = 2,530 ms, TE =
2.58 ms, TI = 1,100 ms, acquisition matrix = 256 × 256 ×
176, sagittal FOV = 220 mm, flip angle = 7, voxel size = 0.9 ×
0.86 × 0.86 mm3 (resized to 1 × 1 × 1 mm3)]. Second, a
fieldmap was calculated to correct for inhomogeneities in
the magnetic field (Cusack & Papadakis, 2002). Next, whole
brain functional images were acquired by using a T2*-weight-
ed gradient echo sequence (TR = 2,000 ms, TE = 35 ms,
image matrix = 64 × 64, FOV = 224 mm, flip angle = 80°,
slice thickness = 3.0 mm, distance factor = 17%, voxel size =
3.5 × 3.5 × 3.5 mm3, 30 axial slices). In the scanner, stimuli
were projected onto a screen at the end of the magnet bore and
participants viewed the stimuli through an angled mirror lo-
cated above their eyes on the head coil. Stimulus presentation
was controlled by E-Prime 2.0 (www.pstnet.com/eprime;
Psychology Software Tools) running under Frames XP.
Participants were placed head first and supine in the scanner
bore. They were instructed not to move their heads to avoid
motion artifacts and foam cushions were placed to minimize
head movements.
Image processing
The fMRI data were preprocessed and analyzed using SPM12
(Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London,
UK). Before statistical analysis, data were preprocessed to
remove sources of noise and artifact. Inhomogeneities in the
magnetic field were corrected using the fieldmap (Cusack &
Papadakis, 2002), slice-time correction was applied to amend
differences in acquisition time between slices for each whole-
brain volume, and realigned within and across runs for the
removal of the movement effects. The functional data were
then transformed into a standard anatomical space (2-mm
isotropic voxels) based on the ICBM152 brain template
(Montreal Neurological Institute). Normalized data were then
spatially smoothed (6-mm full-width at half-maximum,
FWHM) using a Gaussian Kernel. Finally, because there is
no widely accepted method to isolate and remove movement
artifacts from the neural signal in event-related designs
(Caballero-Gaudes & Reynolds, 2017; Ciric et al., 2017;
Satterthwaite et al., 2013) and because studies with nearly
motionless participants (i.e., healthy undergraduates) may
not benefit much from more complex procedures
(Satterthwaite et al., 2013), we adopted a conservative ap-
proach by applying the standard SPM12 procedure in which
six movement regressors are included to the design and an
additional procedure in which noisy motion signals are detect-
ed and removed from the time series using Bspike regression.^
This removal procedure provides a single regressor for each
outlier motion spike and appears to be quite effective (Ciric
et al., 2017; Power et al., 2014; Satterthwaite et al., 2013). In
particular, the preprocessed data were examined, using the
Artifact Detection Tool software package (ART; http://web.
mit.edu/swg/art/art.pdf; http://www.nitrc.org/projects/
artifact_detect/), for excessive motion artifacts and for
correlations between motion and experimental design, and
between global mean signal and experimental design.
Outliers were identified in the temporal differences series by
assessing between-scan differences (Z-threshold: 3.0 mm,
scan to scan movement threshold: 0.5 mm; rotation threshold:
0.02 radians). These outliers were omitted in the analysis by
including a single regressor for each outlier. No systematic
correlations between motion and experimental design or glob-
al signal and experimental design were identified. Six direc-
tions of motion parameters from the realignment step as well
as outlier time points (defined by ART) were included as nui-
sance regressors in the design. We used a default high-pass
filter of 128s and serial correlations were accounted for by the
default auto-regressive AR (1) model.
Statistical analyses
To test our specific predictions, both in the behavioral and
fMRI data analysis we analyze the belief conditions separately
for (a) the Story phase, (b) the Question phase for the self, and
(c) the Question phase for the smurf. Specifically, we com-
pared all belief conditions against each other (Similar True,
Mixed True, Mixed False, Similar False). Note, however, that
during the story phase or when taking a self-perspective, the
Mixed True and Mixed False conditions are collapsed, be-
cause they designate the truth only from the smurf’s perspec-
tive and hence smurfs play an identical role here.
Behavioral data
We analyzed the error rates and response times (RT; correct
trials only and after excluding outliers beyond two and a half
standard deviations from the mean of each condition) from the
question phase. To test our specific hypotheses, for each of the
perspectives (Self and Smurf), differences between conditions
were tested using an analysis of variance (ANOVA), with
Condition as within-participant factor (Similar True, Mixed
True, Mixed False, Similar False; or with the Mixed condi-
tions combined in the Story and Self phases). Significant
ANOVAs were further explored using paired samples t-tests
with p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
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Imagining data
For the first level (individual) analysis, the onset regressors
were defined and analyzed for each condition (Similar True,
Mixed True, Mixed False, Similar False) separately for the
Story and Question phase (Self and Smurf). During the story
phase, participants would understand that the smurfs could
potentially develop a false belief as soon as they would leave
the screen. At the question phase, participants would have to
select the appropriate belief of the smurfs or themselves.
Therefore, the belief formation onset was defined at the be-
ginning of the videos (when the smurfs started to move away)
and the question onset right before the appearance of the ques-
tion bar. We reasoned that it would take some time to follow
the story and understand its mentalizing implications, whereas
when a question appears after the story, mentalizing inferences
should be readily available. Therefore, during the story phase,
event duration after onset was set to 4 seconds (roughly the
duration of the whole story) and during the question phase
duration was set to 0 seconds. To verify this, we estimated
activity given 0- and 4-second durations in both phases, and
the analysis confirmed that these a priori specifications for
duration yielded the strongest effects. A canonical hemody-
namic response function was used to model the hemodynamic
response to each type of event. The six head movement pa-
rameters also were included in the model as nuisance vectors.
Each condition of interest was estimated for each participant,
and extracted for the second level analysis.
In the second level (group) analysis, we computed different
contrast of interests for different perspectives and beliefs as
noted above. That is, we analyzed the Story and Question
phase (for Self and Smurf) separately and computed contrasts
between all conditions (Similar True, Mixed True, Mixed
False, Similar False). Although for the Story and Self condi-
tions, theMixed conditions were collapsed, because they were
undistinguishable for the participants (and contrast weights
were appropriately adjusted so that the weights summed to
0). An initial cluster threshold of p < 0.001 (voxel-wise,
uncorrected) was used with a minimum cluster extent of 10
voxels to define the clusters, and significance was tested with
a cluster FWE-corrected threshold of p < 0.001. In addition,
percent signal changes were computed for a priori regions of
interest (ROI) using MarsBar. These ROIs were centered
around on coordinates from the meta-analyses by Van
Overwalle (2009) and Van Overwalle and Baetens (2009;
see also Ma et al., 2012), using a sphere with a radius of 8
mm, and included the bilateral TPJ (MNI coordinates: ±50 -50
25), pmFC (0 20 45) and bilateral IFG (±40 25 20). We also
used similar a priori coordinates of the TPJ from the 15 false
belief studies in the meta-analysis by Schurz et al. (2014; -55 -
65 27; 56 -56 25) and the mPFC coordinates from van der
Meer et al. (2011; -6 16 46) and a posteriori from this study (-
4 14 56). We selected the coordinates with the strongest
differences between belief conditions, and this included all
coordinates from the Van Overwalle lab, except the TPJ coor-
dinates from Schurz et al. (2014), which showed stronger
effects during the story phase and were used instead.
Differences between conditions were tested using an
ANOVA, and contrasts between conditions were further ex-
plored using simple t-tests with p < 0.05.
Results
We analyzed the belief conditions separately for the Story
phase and the Question phase (Smurf and Self). Our predic-
tion was that when taking a smurf’s perspective, processing
and activation would increase given more false beliefs held by
the smurfs. This should show up in longer behavioral re-
sponses and higher fMRI activation. Note that during the
Story and self-perspective Question phase, the Mixed True
and Mixed False beliefs are collapsed, because the two con-
ditions are indistinguishable for the participants as the two
smurfs play a similar role, because the target of judgment is
only indicated afterwards. (Statistics of all t-tests including t-
values and p-values, are listed in Supplementary Table 2).
Behavioral results
Participants’ RTs and error rates for correct responses during
the Question phase were combined in an Inverse Efficiency
Score (IES) per condition (Similar True, Mixed True, Mixed
False, Similar False; with the Mixed conditions combined in
the Self question phase). An IES (Bruyer & Brysbaert, 2011)
adjusts the response times by dividing them by the accuracy
ratio, so that less correct responses are penalized by slower
efficiency scores (Fig. 2).
With respect to the smurf’s perspective, an ANOVA on
IESs revealed a main effect of Belief condition, F(3, 72) =
20.5, p < 0.001, withmeans showing an increase in IESs given
more agents holding false beliefs. Simple t-tests showed that
IESs were significantly different between all conditions ex-
cept the Mixed False and Similar False conditions, with the
Similar True condition faster than the Mixed True condition,
t(24) = 5.61, p < 0.001, which was faster than the Mixed False
condition, t(24) = 2.47, p < 0.05. With respect to a self-per-
spective, the ANOVA on IESs revealed a very strong main
effect, F(2, 48) = 53,18, p < 0.001. Simple t-tests showed an
unexpected pattern in that IESs were significantly slower after
Mixed as opposed to Similar False or True beliefs, t(24) =
4.24-8.62, p < 0.001. Similar True beliefs were the fastest
overall in comparison with the other conditions, t(24) =
8.39-8.62, p < 0.001.
The pattern of results shows that when taking a smurf’s
perspective, there was a linear effect of number of agents
holding false beliefs as we predicted, except that there were
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no differences between the Similar False and Mixed False
conditions. This pattern was absent when taking a self-per-
spective. Note that the pattern of results for the raw response
times was very similar, although the increasing effect given a
smurf’s perspective was less evident.
fMRI results
We computed whole-brain contrasts for each phase and per-
spective. In addition, to test our prediction of a linearly in-
creasing pattern of activation, we analyzed the percentage
signal change of a priori ROIs in the bilateral TPJ and
pmFC (Fig. 3).
Whole brain analysis
The whole brain analysis of the Story Phase revealed a signif-
icant activation of the pmFC in the comparison of Similar
False Beliefs > Similar True Beliefs, as well as Mixed True
& False Beliefs > Similar True Beliefs (Supplementary
Fig. 2. Mean inverse efficiency score, response times and error rates in
function of condition during the Question phase. Horizontal lines denote
conditions that differ with p ≤ 0.05 using paired t-tests
Fig. 3. Percentage signal change during story and question (Smurf and
Self) phase for mentalizing and conflict monitoring areas. Horizontal
lines denote conditions that differ with p ≤ 0.05 using paired t-tests.
TPJ = temporo-parietal junction (L = left, R = right; MNI coordinates: -
55 -65 27; 56 -56 25), pmFC = posterior frontal cortex (MNI 0 20 45)
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Table 1, Supplementary Figure 1). Other areas revealed also
significant activation in one of these comparisons: The Mixed
True & False Belief > Similar True Belief showed activation
in the bilateral IFG, bilateral precuneus, bilateral superior pa-
rietal cortex, left insula, right caudate, bilateral putamen, and
left middle occipital cortex. Unexpectedly, in the opposite
direction, the Mixed True & False Belief > Similar False
Belief contrast showed activation in the left superior frontal
gyrus, and the Similar True Belief > Similar False Belief con-
trast revealed activation in the medial cuneus and medial
calcarine gyrus. The analysis of the Question phase revealed
no activation above threshold, even with a more lenient FWE-
corrected cluster threshold of p < 0.05.
ROI analysis
In the Story Phase, an ANOVA on the percentage signal
change revealed a main effect in the right TPJ, F(2, 48) =
4.26, p < 0.05, and pmFC, F(2, 48) = 12.79, p < 0.001, with
means showing an increase in activation going from Similar
True, Mixed True & False to Similar False. Simple t-tests
confirmed that in the right TPJ, the Similar False condition
was significantly stronger than the other two conditions, p <
0.05, which did not differ from each other. In the pmFC, all
conditions differed from each other, p < 0.05. There was no
significant main effect in the left TPJ (Fig. 3). For exploratory
reasons, we tested also the bilateral IFG and found that Similar
False Beliefs were most active, sometimes significantly more
so than some other Belief conditions, p < 0.05 (Supplementary
Figure 2).
For the smurf’s perspective in the Question phase, an
ANOVA on the percentage signal change revealed a main
effect in the right TPJ, F(3, 72) = 2.70, p = 0.052, and
pmFC, F(3, 72) = 4.32, p < 0.01, with means showing an
increase in activation going from Similar True, Mixed True,
Mixed False to Similar False. Simple t-tests largely confirmed
this pattern, although not all conditions differed significantly
between each other. In the right TPJ, the Similar False condi-
tion was significantly stronger than the Mixed True and
Similar True conditions only, p < 0.05. In the mPFC, the
Similar False condition was significantly stronger than the
Mixed False and Similar True conditions, p < 0.05, and mar-
ginally so for the Mixed True condition, p = 0.055. There was
no significant main effect in the left TPJ (Fig. 3). The bilateral
IFG showed again that Similar False Beliefs were most active,
sometimes significantly more so than other Belief conditions
(Supplementary Figure 2).
For a self-perspective, the signal change analysis revealed a
significant main effect in the pmFC, F(2, 48) = 3.44, p < 0.05.
However, simple t-tests revealed that the activation in the
Similar False condition was significantly lower than in the
Mixed True & False condition in the bilateral TPJ and
pmFC, while the latter condition did not differ significantly
from the Similar True condition (Fig. 3). These data seem to
suggest that the TPJ and pmFC are more activated given a
self-perspective when at least one smurf has a belief similar
to the self. The bilateral IFG showed similar effects
(Supplementary Figure 2).
For exploratory reasons, we also analyzed the dorsal and
ventral part of the medial prefrontal cortex which are key areas
in mentalizing (Schurz et al., 2014; Van Overwalle, 2009), but
found little modulation in any of the perspectives or phases
(Supplementary Figure 2).
Discussion
An important limitation of past research on mentalizing is that
false beliefs were investigated almost exclusively for a single
agent, either alone (Bardi et al., 2017; Özdem, Brass, et al.,
2017; Schuwerk et al., 2014) or in the context of another agent
who always held true beliefs (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). To
investigate the role of number of false beliefs in a more sys-
temically manner, this study investigated for the first time
distinct beliefs held by two agents by varying all combinations
of their true and false beliefs. Moreover, to enforce the com-
putation of beliefs to each agent, we distinguished between an
initial Story phase, in which all the perspectives of all agents
(smurfs and self) had to be considered, and a subsequent
Question phase, in which a single perspective had to be taken
(see also Schuwerk et al., 2014). Our key prediction was that
false beliefs held by more agents would generate increasingly
more TPJ activation when taking the agent’s perspective. In
addition, given that one’s self-perspective was prominent, we
also expected an increase of Bdecoupling^ or inhibition of
one’s own perspective on the truth in favor of the false beliefs
held by the agents, eliciting a similar increasing pattern of
executive control in the pmFC.
The behavioral results revealed an increase in response
times (adjusted for accuracy) given false beliefs held by more
agents when taking an agent’s perspective, resulting in the
slowest responses in the mixed or shared false belief condi-
tions which did not differ. These results give some support for
our hypothesis. This pattern of results was completely absent
when taking a self-perspective and rather showed the slowest
response time in the mixed condition.
TPJ and switching to internal thoughts
The increasing pattern of activation in the right TPJ given
false beliefs held by more agents supports our prediction and
the crucial role of the TPJ in orienting to the belief of each
agent. Of critical importance is that during the Story phase,
two agents holding false beliefs revealed stronger right TPJ
activation than if one of these agents held a false belief, or
none of the agents held false beliefs. That is, we found an
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additional effect of a second false belief on right TPJ activity
over and above the effect of just one false belief. Our results
are consistent with Schuwerk et al. (2014) who used a very
similar paradigm with a single agent, as well as much prior
work on false belief reasoning (see meta-analyses by Schurz
et al., 2014; Van Overwalle, 2009; Van Overwalle & Baetens,
2009). The increasing pattern of TPJ activation when false
beliefs are held by more agents confirms the role of the TPJ
in reorienting attention to other minds, especially when there
is more than one mind to consider (Cabeza et al., 2012). As
stated by Bardi et al. (2017), the TPJ is associated Bwith self-
other distinction, i.e., the ability to keep self and other repre-
sentations apart and switch between them.^ Apparently, our
pattern of increasing activation demonstrates that this reorien-
tation process is graded and increasingly more applied when
more agents hold false beliefs, probably because this entails a
greater reliance on and switching to our inner thoughts about
false beliefs in comparison with a focus on reality (Cabeza
et al., 2012).
However, a limitation of the present paradigm, as well as
prior research, is that most often only two belief states are
possible (e.g., left or right frame as in our study; or two story
responses as in prior research). To provide a correct response
on a false belief question, it is sufficient to switch one’s per-
spective away from the truth response option towards the al-
ternate response option (Cabeza et al., 2012), without consid-
ering the full content of the false belief. Even in the present
work, when one or two agents hold similar or opposing be-
liefs, a correct response can simply be obtained by tagging
each agent’s presence or belief as true or false and switching
from the truth to the alternative response option when the
belief is false. This can be accomplished without processing
the belief content itself. Further research is needed to investi-
gate whether switching between perspectives and simply tag-
ging presence/beliefs as true or false versus elaborating on the
content of these beliefs and holding these in one’s mind are
related or distinct neural processes recruiting the same or dis-
tinct brain areas.
pmFC and decoupling from one’s self-perspective
on reality
As interesting aspect of the present paradigm is that an in-
crease in activation of the pmFC was observed given false
beliefs held by more agents, in a similar increasing pattern
as the TPJ. In most false belief research, activation of the
mPFC is not revealed, unless one’s self-perspective is made
more salient (Hartwright et al., 2015; van der Meer et al.,
2011). This suggests that the pmFC reflects the discrepancy
between own and other perspective or beliefs. Indeed, false
beliefs require participants inhibiting their own knowledge
about the true state of reality to understand the false beliefs
by other agents. In the present study, one’s self-perspective
was salient, because the participants had to consider both their
own and the agent’s perspectives when the animation unfold-
ed and were thus forced to keep discrepant true and false
beliefs in mind, but strictly apart. The fact that an agent’s
perspective was requested only after the animation ended
may have further increased this discrepancy and the role the
pmFC played in our study.
The increasing pattern of activation in the pmFC given
more discrepant false beliefs is consistent with the view that
false belief reasoning involves a process of Bdecoupling^
whereby participants inhibit their self-beliefs in order to un-
derstand the discrepant mental beliefs of others. We argue that
decoupling is a form of conflict processing and resolution
(Botvinick et al., 2004; Shenhav, Cohen, & Botvinick,
2016), in which the pmFC is associated with conflict moni-
toring (i.e., observing a discrepancy between the beliefs of self
and other), thereby allocating optimal executive control in the
lateral IFG to resolve the conflict. One obvious way of conflict
resolution is by attributing or Btagging^ false beliefs to indi-
vidual agents and preserve that information in working mem-
ory until a response on a specific perspective can be provided.
This interpretation is plausible given recent evidence from
Meyer, Spunt, Berkman, Taylor, and Lieberman (2012);
Meyer, Taylor, and Lieberman (2015), indicating that holding
social information in working memory activates executive
brain areas including the pmFC and bilateral IFG, and that
this activation grows stronger with an increasing amount of
social information that needs to be memorized. Their study
required participants to mentally rank two, three, or four per-
sons according to a given trait (e.g., funny). The results
showed that ranking an increasing number of persons on a
social dimension augmented activation in the executive con-
trol network encompassing the pmFC and IFG. It should be
noted, however, that Samson and colleagous (Samson,
Houthuys, & Humphreys, 2015) challenged the idea that
self-perspective inhibition is a domain-general executive pro-
cess; they demonstrated that deficits in self-inhibition are dis-
sociated from deficits in classic executive tasks. Moreover, we
note that while the pmFC showed a clear increasing pattern of
activation when dealing with more agents holding false be-
liefs, this pattern was reduced in the bilateral IFG showing
only increased activation for false beliefs held by two agents.
More research is needed to investigate the distinct roles of the
pmFC and the IFG in social memory processing.
Taking a self-perspective
When taking a self-perspective, we observed a very unexpect-
ed pattern of results. We found increasing activation when the
agents held mixed beliefs and the least activation when both
agents held false beliefs. This pattern suggests that situations
in which agents holdmixed beliefs appear most conflicting for
the self in contrast to less ambiguous situations where agents
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hold beliefs that are entirely (dis)similar to the self. This sug-
gests an unexpected impact of other perspectives on reality
processing by the self, which also was revealed in previous
research on automatic perspective taking (Qureshi, Apperly,
& Samson, 2010; Ramsey, Hansen, Apperly, & Samson,
2013). Because this is the first time that a self-perspective
was analyzed in a false belief task, more research is needed
to investigate the robustness of the present results.
Conclusions
We developed a novel false belief task by having two agents
instead of a single agent holding false or true beliefs, with the
goal to better understand the mechanisms underlying false be-
lief mentalizing.We found that the TPJ is increasingly activated
when participants track false beliefs of two agents rather than a
single agent or no one. However, this pattern of results only
occurs when participants take the perspective of the agent (as in
classic false belief tasks). This increasing activation of the TPJ
suggest increasing processing costs to reorient to false beliefs of
multiple agents. We also found a similar pattern in the pmFC,
suggesting that false beliefs by multiple agents are perceived as
increasingly conflicting with one’s self-perspective on reality
(Botvinick et al., 2004; Shenhav et al., 2016). When taking a
self-perspective, we found most activation when the other
agents held mixed beliefs, suggesting that this situation is per-
haps most ambiguous with respect to the self.
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